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“LIQUIDATED DAMAGES” IN GUEST 
WORKER CONTRACTS:  
INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE, DEBT 
PEONAGE OR VALID CONTRACT CLAUSE? 
Maria L. Ontiveros* 
Non-citizen migrant workers who come to the United States on short term 
work visas, especially H-1B visas, often sign contracts that include a promise to 
work for the employer for a set period of time. These contracts may include a 
“liquidated damages clause” that requires the worker to pay the employer a 
large sum of money if they stop working for the employer, either to switch em-
ployers or to return home. Because these sums of money are so large relative to 
the worker’s ability to pay, they prevent workers from leaving employment. This 
paper examines whether those liquidated damages clauses are enforceable. It 
suggests that there are two different ways to analyze these clauses: a contract law 
approach and a free labor approach. The contract law approach, found in state 
contract law and the statute that regulates H-1B visas, serves the dual purposes 
of efficiency and compensation. The free labor approach, found in a variety of 
statutes passed pursuant to the Thirteenth Amendment to the United States Con-
stitution, on the other hand serves the purposes of protecting individuals and so-
ciety from the ills associated with modern day slavery. This article examines two 
different prohibitions contained in the free labor approach—prohibitions against 
involuntary servitude and debt peonage. It explores and explains the differences 
between these variations on unfree labor, with a focus on the purpose of prohibit-
ing each arrangement. The article then returns to the problem of liquidated dam-
ages clauses in guest worker contracts to examine the implications of these com-
peting approaches (contract law vs. free labor) for advocates, courts and 
Congress. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 2010, Rituraj Singh Panwar, a migrant from India, completed his educa-
tion in the United States after receiving masters degrees in kinesiology and 
hospital management.1 In order to stay and work in the United States, he signed 
an agreement to work as an H-1B “guest worker” with RN Staff/Access Tech-
nologies.2 Under the visa statute, Access Technologies had applied for and re-
ceived the right to hire an H-1B worker, and it controlled who could fill that 
                                                        
1  These facts are drawn from Panwar v. Access Therapies, Inc., 975 F. Supp. 2d 948, 952 
(S.D. Ind. 2013) (Panwar I) and Panwar v. Access Therapies, Inc., No. 1:12-CV-00619-
TWP-TAB, 2015 WL 1396599, at *1 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 25, 2015) (Panwar II). 
2  Panwar I, 975 F. Supp. at 953–54. 
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visa.3 If Panwar left this employment, he would need to leave the country and 
Access Technologies could fill the opening with another guest worker. The par-
ties signed a two-year employment agreement stating that Panwar would re-
ceive between $800 and $1000 a week to work as a physical therapist.4 As part 
of the agreement, Access Technologies demanded that Panwar sign a $20,000 
promissory note payable as “liquidated damages” if he left before the end of the 
contract term.5 Panwar soon realized that Access Technologies was not provid-
ing the employment he expected.6 In violation of the H-1B program require-
ments, Access Technologies required Panwar to pay for his visa, did not give 
him a work assignment or paycheck for eight months, and eventually placed 
him in a job with a substantially lower pay rate.7 Panwar wanted to quit his em-
ployment and find other work, but he could not because he was unable to pay 
$20,000 (the equivalent of almost five years’ salary in his native India).8 When 
Panwar complained about the work arrangements, Access Technologies threat-
ened to a fire him.9 As a result, he was left in the position of neither being able 
to quit nor to advocate for better conditions. Either action would result in crush-
ing debt, as well as deportation.10 Access Technologies eventually discharged 
Panwar, revoked his visa, and sued him to recover the $20,000 in liquidated 
damages.11 Panwar brought suit alleging violations of the visa statute and fed-
eral anti-trafficking laws.12 
Panwar’s situation is not unique. Many contracts signed by visa workers 
include a “liquidated damages clause” that requires the worker to pay the em-
ployer a large sum of money if they stop working for the employer, either to 
switch employers or to return home.13 These clauses may also be triggered if 
the party is fired or constructively discharged.14 Because these sums of money 
are so large relative to the worker’s ability to pay, they prevent workers from 
                                                        
3  See id. at 952–53. 
4  Id. at 954. 
5  Panwar II, 2015 WL 1396599 at, *2. 
6  Id. 
7  Panwar I, 975 F. Supp. at 954. 
8  Id. at 958. Currency Converter, OANDA, https://www.oanda.com/currency/converter/ [http 
s://perma.cc/9JQX-UZCG] (last visited Jan. 3, 2019); Physiotherapist Salary in India, 
NAUKRIHUB, http://www.naukrihub.com/salary-in-india/salary-of-physical-therapist.html [ht 
tps://perma.cc/M5BL-BHXE] (last visited Jan. 3, 2019). 
9  See Panwar I, 975 F. Supp. at 954. 
10  Panwar II, 2015 WL 1396599, at *2. 
11  Id. 
12  Panwar I, 975 F. Supp. at 957. 
13  See Matt Smith et al., Job Brokers Steal Wages and Entrap Indian Tech Workers in US, 
GUARDIAN (Oct. 28, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2014/oct/28/-sp-jobs-brok 
ers-entrap-indian-tech-workers [https://perma.cc/5393-NEZB]. 
14  Constructive discharge occurs when an employee is forced to quit because of oppressive 
conditions. 20 C.F.R. § 655.731(c)(10)(i)(C) (2019) requires that the Department of Labor 
consider the actions of the employer that contributed to the employee ceasing employment. 
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leaving employment or, in many situations, from advocating for better condi-
tions.15 
This article examines whether those liquidated damages clauses are en-
forceable. It suggests that there are two different ways to analyze these clauses: 
a contract law approach and a free labor approach. The contract law ap-
proach—found in state contract law and the statute that regulates H-1B visas—
serves efficiency purposes by providing for the general enforceability of con-
tracts, while also allowing for the payment of certain compensatory remedies 
for breach.16 The visa statute starts with this general orientation but modifies it 
to recognize the special circumstances surrounding visa contracts. On the other 
hand, the free labor approach—found in a variety of statutes passed pursuant to 
the Thirteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution—focuses on the 
purposes behind the prohibitions of involuntary servitude and of debt peon-
age.17 Although these two arrangements are related and both fit within the am-
bit of modern day slavery, there are subtle differences between them that are 
worth exploring and making explicit. “Involuntary servitude” focuses on the 
harms to an individual and society when an employee is unable to quit work 
because the individual is unable to pay a large debt or for other reasons.18 
“Debt peonage” focuses on the harms that arise when that inability to quit is 
linked to a requirement that the employee work for a specific person in ex-
change for payment of a debt.19 These harms occur even if the individual vol-
untarily entered into the arrangement and even if the debt is relatively small.20 
This paper argues that liquidated damages clauses in visa contracts must be an-
alyzed under both the contract law and free labor approaches because they 
serve different purposes. It also offers suggestions to attorney advocates, 
courts, legislatures and academics to ensure that both approaches are consid-
ered in these cases. 
The first section of this article describes the problem of liquidated damages 
clauses in guest worker contracts, including how they arise, their prevalence, 
and the role played by the worker’s inability to challenge contract breaches 
committed by the employer. The second section of the article explains the two 
different approaches used to evaluate the validity of these clauses—the contract 
                                                        
15  In many of the cases reviewed, the employer threatens to discharge the worker for com-
plaining. See infra Sections II.A, II.B. 
16  See infra Section II.A. 
17  See infra Section II.B. 
18  See infra Section II.B.1.b. This article will only explore involuntary servitude tied to the 
payment of debt. Other types of arrangements can lead to involuntary servitude. For a dis-
cussion of some other types of arrangements leading to involuntary servitude, see Kathleen 
Kim, Beyond Coercion, 62 UCLA L. REV. 1558, 1560 (2015). 
19  Other forms of peonage may exist, but this article focuses on a peonage relationship 
caused by debt. This paper uses the term debt peonage because it best captures the historical 
and contemporary language found in statutes and case law, while still focusing on debt 
caused by liquidated damages. See infra Section II.B.2. 
20  See infra Section II.B.2. 
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law approach and the free labor approach. After discussing the contract law ap-
proach, this section analyzes these arrangements as potential violations of the 
prohibitions against involuntary servitude and debt peonage. By exploring the 
definitions and harms of these prohibitions separately, this section advances the 
understanding of the Thirteenth Amendment because it unpacks the differences 
between involuntary servitude and debt peonage, while also recognizing their 
overlaps. The final section of the article returns to the case of Rituraj Singh 
Panwar, presenting and critiquing the outcome of the case under both the con-
tract approach and the free labor approach. Building on the critique of Panwar 
the paper concludes with strategic recommendations for attorney advocates, 
courts, and policy makers. 
I. THE PROBLEM OF LIQUIDATED DAMAGES CLAUSES IN GUEST WORKER 
CONTRACTS 
The United States established the so-called “guest worker” visa program in 
order to allow non-citizen migrants to work in the U.S. for a limited period of 
time.21 Visas are available for selected occupations, such as skilled, technical 
jobs (covered by the H-1B visa), agriculture (H-2A visa) and laborers (H-2B).22 
Under the program, once an employer obtains a visa, it can fill the visa position 
with a qualified worker.23 The program is structured so that the visa is applied 
for, given to, held by, and controlled by the employer.24 Once an employee is 
selected to fill a visa opening, he or she becomes eligible to live and work in 
the U.S. on that visa.25 If the employee separates from employment with that 
                                                        
21  Some may be renewed for an additional time period, but there are generally cumulative 
time limits for any individual worker. At the end of this time period, the worker must either 
leave the country or become a naturalized citizen. Temporary (Nonimmigrant) Workers, U.S. 
CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., https://www.uscis.gov/working-united-states/temporary-non 
immigrant-workers [https://perma.cc/U4D4-GXD8] (last updated Sept. 7, 2011). 
22  Id. Other common visa holders include student workers and nannies brought in under the 
J-1 visa program. Exchange Visitors, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., https://www.uscis. 
gov/working-united-states/students-and-exchange-visitors/exchange-visitors [https://perma.c 
c/WK3M-XFU3] (last updated Nov. 8, 2018). Since participants in this program work 
through an exchange program that operates differently than a traditional employment ar-
rangement, they are not addressed in this article. 
23  Temporary (Nonimmigrant) Workers, supra note 21. For an example of worker qualifica-
tions, see H1-B Specialty Occupations, DOD Cooperative Research and Development Pro-
ject Workers, and Fashion Models, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., https://www.uscis. 
gov/working-united-states/temporary-workers/h-1b-specialty-occupations-dod-cooperative-r 
esearch-and-development-project-workers-and-fashion-models [https://perma.cc/CD4H-HU 
SM] (last updated Apr. 3, 2017). 
24  Maria L. Ontiveros, H-1B Visas, Outsourcing and Body Shops: A Continuum of Exploita-
tion for High Tech Workers, 38 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 6–9 (2017). 
25  Temporary (Nonimmigrant) Workers, supra note 21. 
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employer, either because they quit or are fired, the worker loses legal authoriza-
tion to be in the country and becomes deportable.26 
The employment of guest workers is regulated by both common law and a 
variety of statutes. As employees, they are covered by state and federal em-
ployment statutes such as wage and hour regulations, anti-discrimination provi-
sions, and labor trafficking protection laws. Guest workers who sign contracts 
with their employers—a practice that is particularly common for H-1B work-
ers—are covered by state common law of contracts. In addition, the visa statute 
provides specific protection for the workers.27 The validity of liquidated dam-
ages clauses in guest worker contracts are typically analyzed under state com-
mon law, the visa statute and federal labor trafficking protection laws.28 
Cases brought by employers against visa employees to enforce liquidated 
damages are typically filed as breach of contract claims in state superior courts. 
As a result, they can be difficult to track unless they are appealed to a higher 
level. In order to determine the prevalence of liquidated damages clause en-
forcement in guest worker contracts, the Center for Investigative Reporting 
searched court dockets in geographic areas with high tech companies and found 
hundreds of cases where companies had sued H-1B workers for leaving before 
the end of the contract term.29 Other examples of the problem are found in cas-
es brought by guest workers challenging liquidated damages provisions under 
either the visa statute or federal laws.30 
The possibility of having to pay $20,000 or another similarly large amount 
makes it very difficult for an employee to quit because the average technical 
college graduate in India earns between $4,500 and $6,000 per year.31 In many 
situations, the workers are already in debt because they had to borrow money to 
pay for a visa fee—typically around $3,000.32 The employers and recruiting 
companies will often pursue enforcement of these judgments in India against 
the employee’s family as well.33 The problem is multiplied because once the 
employer sues one worker, the employer can credibly threaten suit against other 
workers in order to prevent them from quitting.34 
In Panwar’s case and others, the employer appears to be in violation of the 
contract and the visa law. Thus, it seems that the employee should be able to 
remedy their situation (i.e. be given a placement or be paid at an appropriate 
                                                        
26  Norman Matloff, On the Need for Reform of the H-1B Non-Immigrant Work Visa in 
Computer-Related Occupations, 36 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 815, 868 (2003); Sharmila Ru-
drappa, Cyber-Coolies and Techno-Braceros: Race and Commodification of Indian Infor-
mation Technology Guest Workers in the United States, 44 U.S.F. L. REV. 353, 368 (2009). 
27  See infra Section II.A.2; See generally 20 C.F.R. §§ 655.700–760 (2019). 
28  See infra Sections II.A, II.B. 
29  Smith et al., supra note 13. 
30  See infra Section II.B.1. 
31  Smith et al., supra note 13. 
32  Id. 
33  Id. 
34  Ontiveros, supra note 24, at 20–21 and cases discussed below. 
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rate) by suing for breach of contract or prosecuting the employer under the 
statute. However, this is not a viable approach for several reasons.35 First, many 
employees are not aware of their rights and may have limited access to the legal 
system, either because of lack of resources or because of restrictions placed on 
legal services providers in the statute.36 More importantly, they are intimidated 
by the employer and fear being discharged and deported if they complain. One 
researcher concluded, “[v]isa holders, by the very nature of their situation as 
workers dependent upon employers for the right to remain in the country—
either permanently or temporarily—remain less likely to protest against unfair 
working conditions than their counterparts with permanent resident status.”37 
Finally, bringing a private cause of action is slow, difficult and perceived as in-
effective,38 while enforcement by state agencies has not been as effective as an-
ticipated.39 
Cases evaluating the enforceability of liquidated damages come to court in 
several different ways. If an individual believes the visa statute has been violat-
ed, he or she must first file a claim with an administrative agency because there 
is no right to bring a private cause of action in federal court.40 An administra-
tive law judge decides the case, which is then reviewed by the U.S. Department 
of Labor Administrative Review Board.41 Parties may then appeal to a U.S. 
District Court.42 Alternatively, if an employee believes that the liquidated dam-
ages clause violates an independent federal statute, such as the free labor stat-
utes discussed below, the employee may challenge the clause directly in federal 
court.43 Finally, if an employer sues an employee to recover liquidated damag-
                                                        
35  See id. at 11–14. 
36  This is particularly a problem for H-2A agricultural workers and H-2B laborers. 
Alejandro V. Cortes, Note, The H-2A Farmworker: The Latest Incarnation of the Judicially 
Handicapped and Why the Use of Mediation to Resolve Employment Disputes Will Improve 
Their Rights, 21 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOL. 409, 415–21 (2006). See also Alison K. Guernsey, 
Double Denial: How Both the DOL and Organized Labor Fail Domestic Agricultural Work-
ers in the Face of H-2A, 93 IOWA L. REV. 277, 291–99 (2007); Michael Holley, Disadvan-
taged by Design: How the Law Inhibits Agricultural Guest Workers from Enforcing their 
Rights, 18 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 575, 597–616 (2001); Maria L. Ontiveros, Immigrant 
Workers and the Thirteenth Amendment, in THE PROMISES OF LIBERTY 279, 282 (Alexander 
Tsesis ed., 2010). 
37  Todd H. Goodsell, Note, On the Continued Need for H-1B Reform: A Partial, Statutory 
Suggestion to Protect Foreign and U.S. Workers, 21 BYU J. PUB. L. 153, 172 (2007). 
38  Alaina M. Beach, H-1B Visa Legislation: Legal Deficiencies and the Need for Reform, 6 
S.C. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 273, 282 (2010). 
39  Ontiveros, supra note 24, at 28 (“The overall lesson from these cases is that although em-
ployees and the government are bringing actual, harmful violations [of the visa laws] to 
courts, they face a long, slow and often ineffective road.”). 
40  Id. 
41  Id. 
42  Watson v. Bank of Am., 196 F. App’x 306, 307 (5th Cir. 2006); Venkatraman v. REI 
Sys., Inc., 417 F.3d 418, 423–24 (4th Cir. 2005); Gupta v. Perez, 101 F. Supp. 3d 437, 460–
61 (D.N.J. 2015). 
43  28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012). 
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es, the employee may argue that it is unenforceable under state law or the visa 
law. If the employer prevails and the employee faces a judgment requiring 
payment of a claim, the employee can then file a claim with the Department of 
Labor alleging a violation of the visa law.44 No matter how these cases reach 
the courts, two different approaches have been used to examine their validity: 
contract law and free labor. 
II. TWO APPROACHES TO EVALUATING THE VALIDITY OF LIQUIDATED 
DAMAGES 
The validity of liquidated damages clauses are adjudicated under two dif-
ferent approaches: the contract law approach and the free labor approach. The 
former is primarily a creature of state law and is meant to serve interests of ef-
ficiency in the enforcement of contracts and fair compensation when a contract 
is breached. The latter is mainly a federal law concern originating in the Thir-
teenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which eliminated slavery and in-
voluntary servitude.45 This section describes the two approaches—explaining 
how they have been applied in guest worker liquidated damages cases and ana-
lyzing their underlying purposes. Because these approaches serve such different 
policies, both must be considered independently in evaluating the validity of 
these clauses. 
A. The Contract Law Approach 
Courts often employ a two-step process when considering liquidated dam-
ages clause cases in the guest worker context. As a starting point, courts look to 
the state common law of contract which tends to allow liquidated damages 
clauses so long as they are compensatory and not punitive.46 Next, in many 
cases, they will also evaluate the contract law provision found specifically in 
the visa statute, which validates the importance of the state law but also impos-
es additional restrictions.47 
1. State Common Law 
Most states allow liquidated damages to be assessed in limited situations. 
The amount of the damages must be “reasonable in the light of the anticipated 
or actual loss caused by the breach and the difficulties of proof of loss.”48 Stip-
ulated damages that are too large are unenforceable as a penalty that violates 
public policy.49 In determining whether the amount is reasonable, courts look at 
                                                        
44  Ontiveros, supra note 24, at 32–35. 
45  See infra Section II.B.1. 
46  See infra Section II.A.1. 
47  See infra Section II.A.2. 
48  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356 (AM LAW. INST. 1981). 
49  Id. at cmt. b. 
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whether it approximates the amount anticipated to be lost at the time the con-
tract was made or if it approximates the amount actually lost in retrospect.50 In 
addition, the party seeking to collect the damages must show that the damages 
are difficult to estimate.51 
Courts have followed this approach in evaluating liquidated damages 
clauses in H-1B contracts. In Tekstrom v. Savla, for example, Sameer Savla 
signed an agreement to fill an H-1B position with Tekstrom that included a liq-
uidated damages clause requiring him to pay Tekstrom $18,000 if he left em-
ployment early.52 When Savla reported to work, he expected to complete a 
three-week training course and then be placed into a job.53 Instead, he was 
housed in an overcrowded apartment, forced to sleep on the floor in a sleeping 
bag, refused the promised health insurance and not given a position for four 
months.54 One of the other participants left the program, and Tekstrom told 
Savla that if he tried to leave, “he would make an example of him.”55 After 
Savla was finally placed in a short term assignment, he inquired about his visa, 
pay stubs, and employment contract.56 Tekstrom threatened Savla with “a civil 
lawsuit, criminal charges, possible deportation and the destruction of his ca-
reer” if he persisted in complaining and asking questions.57 Savla became so 
stressed and physically ill over these threats that he left the assignment.58 
Tekstrom sued Savla for $18,000, citing the liquidated damages clause in 
the contract and arguing that it would cover “the company’s estimate of its in-
vestment in a trainee, including housing, training, software licensing fees, mar-
keting efforts and work performed by Tekstrom’s staff as well as potential lost 
revenues from the early termination of a prospective work assignment.”59 Savla 
argued that the liquidated damages clause was unenforceable and filed counter-
claims for tort and contract violations.60 The court found that the liquidated 
damages clause was void as a penalty because it violated both requirements for 
a valid clause.61 The court said that the company could have easily estimated 
the actual costs of housing and training, so the costs were not difficult to esti-
mate.62 In addition, the fee bore no relation to the specified bases for the dam-
                                                        
50  Id. 
51  Id. 
52  Tekstrom, Inc. v. Savla, C.A. No. 05A-12-006 (JTV), 2006 WL 2338050, at *2 (Del. Su-
per. Ct. July 31, 2006). 
53  Id. at *1. 
54  Id. at *2. 
55  Id. 
56  Id. at *3. 
57  Id. 
58  Id. 
59  Id. at *6. 
60  Id. at *3. 
61  Id. at *6. 
62  Id. 
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ages.63 The court concluded, “Savla would have had to pay the $18,000 in pen-
alty whether he was working for one day or eighteen months. There is nothing 
in the record to show how the amount was arrived at or whether it is propor-
tionate to whatever actual damage would result from a contract breach.”64 
Therefore, the court refused to make Savla pay Tekstrom the money.65 
An evaluation of liquidated damages clauses under contract law recognizes 
that the purpose of awarding damages for breach of contract is compensatory, 
not punitive.66 Contract law is not concerned with ensuring that a deal is con-
summated or that a promise is kept.67 A promise can be broken if the breaching 
party pays the other party to the contract an appropriate amount of compensa-
tion.68 In other words, contract law does not seek to punish someone for break-
ing a promise or to force someone into completing a deal for its own sake. It 
seeks to either enforce the contract OR to make sure that there is adequate 
compensation. A clause that is punitive, and therefore unenforceable, is one 
that seeks to coerce performance rather than estimate damages. Punitive clauses 
are unenforceable because they serve only to punish someone for breaking a 
promise, do not serve the purpose of compensation, and have “no justification 
on either economic or other grounds.”69 Some contract scholars explain the ba-
sis for this approach under the theory of “efficient breach,” which argues that 
sometimes it is more efficient or beneficial to the breaching party to breach the 
contract and pay the damage.70 Society benefits from this view of contracts be-
cause it maximizes the efficiency of the transaction. Liquidated damages claus-
es which punish parties run afoul of these basic contract policies of efficiency 
and compensation because they do not allow for an efficient breach to occur. 
2. The Visa Statute 
The guest worker visa statute builds upon these basic common law contract 
principles when evaluating liquidated damages clauses but adds additional 
guidance for judges. Regulations passed pursuant to the statute specify that em-
ployers may not penalize employees for ceasing employment prior to an agreed 
date, but they do permit the employer to collect “bona fide liquidated damag-
                                                        
63  Id. 
64  Id. 
65  Id. 
66  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356, cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1981); 24 
WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 65:1 (4th ed. 2018). 
67  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356, cmt. a; 24 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS 
§ 65:1. 
68  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356, cmt. a; 24 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS 
§ 65:1. 
69  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356, cmt. a. 
70  Barry E. Adler, Efficient Breach Theory Through the Looking Glass, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1679, 1688 (2008) (describing efficient breach theory as “a cornerstone of the economic 
analysis of contract law”). 
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es.”71 In evaluating whether the required payments are allowable as liquidated 
damages, courts are instructed to use applicable state law and look to whether 
the damages are “reasonable approximations or estimates of the anticipated or 
actual damage caused to one party by the other party’s breach of the con-
tract.”72 In addition, the regulations explain that state law generally requires 
“that the relation or circumstances of the parties, and the purpose(s) of the 
agreement, are to be taken into account,” and that “a payment would be consid-
ered to be a prohibited penalty where it is the result of fraud or where it cloaks 
oppression.”73 The regulations also state that “the sum stipulated must take into 
account whether the contract breach is total or partial (i.e., the percentage of the 
employment contract completed).”74 Finally, the regulations provide that alt-
hough the Administrator shall apply relevant state law, the application shall in-
clude “consideration where appropriate to actions by the employer, if any, con-
tributing to the early cessation, such as the employer’s constructive discharge 
of the nonimmigrant or non-compliance with its obligations under the INA and 
its regulations.”75 
The regulatory history of the regulations passed pursuant to the visa statute 
provide insight on the purpose of the language requiring these additional con-
siderations. The Department of Labor sought input on how it should determine 
whether a payment required for ceasing employment is a prohibited penalty or 
allowable liquidated damages.76 The Department of Labor originally took the 
position that the regulations should not specify any particular guidelines and 
should instead leave the matter to the discretion of state court judges to only 
apply this regulation based on state law.77 The Department opined that state 
courts were better able than a federal administrative forum to address “the vari-
ous legal questions posed by any agreement between an employer and an H-1B 
worker, and to conclusively determine whether a particular provision runs afoul 
of State law.”78 It also stated that the Department lacked expertise in interpret-
                                                        
71  20 C.F.R. § 655.731(c)(10)(i)(A)–(B) (2019). 
72  20 C.F.R. § 655.731(c)(10)(i)(C). 
73  Id. 
74  Id. 
75  Id. In addition, the liquidated damages may not be used to cover or rebate the 
$500/$1,000 filing fee under section 214(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”). 
Id. Further, any payments for liquidated damages must comply with 20 C.F.R. 
§ 655.731(c)(9). Id. § 655.731(c)(10)(i)(B). These require, among other things that any de-
ductions must be agreed to voluntarily and in writing by the employee; intended to benefit 
the employees, not simply cover the employer’s regular business expenses; not exceed the 
stated expenses; and not exceed the federal limits on garnishment of wages. Id. 
§ 655.731(c)(9)(iii)(A)–(E). 
76  Labor Condition Applications and Requirements for Employers Using Nonimmigrants on 
H-1B Visas in Specialty Occupations and as Fashion Models; Labor Certification Process for 
Permanent Employment of Aliens in the United States, 64 Fed. Reg. 628, 648 (Jan. 5, 1999) 
(to be codified at 20 C.F.R. §§ 655–56). 
77  Id. 
78  Id. 
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ing state law.79 Commenters strongly objected to this approach, arguing that it 
was contrary to the intent of the visa law and “inconsistent with the role intend-
ed for the Department”.80 In response, the Department changed its approach. It 
stated, “Notwithstanding the Department’s continued reluctance to identify and 
interpret State law, the Department now concurs with the view that Congress 
intended the Department to determine whether a provision is liquidated damag-
es or a penalty.”81 
As a result, the final regulations start with a reiteration of general state con-
tract law, prohibiting penalties for quitting work before the end of the contract 
term but allowing liquidated damages that are reasonable estimates of damag-
es.82 It then supplements that statement with three additional guidelines. These 
require that the relationships and circumstances of the parties must be taken in-
to account (including the presence of fraud or oppression); that the amount 
must be adjusted depending upon how much time has been worked by the em-
ployee; and that the validity may turn on whether the employee’s resignation 
was actually a constructive discharge caused by the employer’s actions.83 Thus, 
the intent of the visa statute is to take a more nuanced look at liquidated dam-
ages clauses in guest worker contracts than that found under state common law, 
in order to take into account the special power imbalance of this situation. In 
addition, it recognizes that an all-or-nothing type of liquidated damages clause 
is usually punitive. Finally, it counsels that sometimes a voluntary quit or res-
ignation should be treated as a discharge. 
Novinvest provides an example of how courts apply the visa provision.84 In 
that case, four visa workers left their work early and their employer sued in a 
Georgia state court to recoup the liquidated damages specified in the contract.85 
The employer secured a state court judgment requiring the employees to pay a 
$5,000 “investment fee” to cover the business expenses necessary to “hire, train 
and process” the employees.86 The employees filed an administrative law com-
plaint with the Department of Labor under the relevant visa law.87 The adminis-
trative law judge (“ALJ”) found that the fee violated both the state liquidated 
damages law, which is incorporated in the visa statute, and the visa statute pro-
                                                        
79  Id. 
80  Labor Conditions Applications and Requirements for Employers Using Nonimmigrants 
on H-1B Visas in Specialty Occupations and as Fashion Models; Labor Certification Process 
for Permanent Employment of Aliens in the United States, 65 Fed. Reg. 80110, 80173 (Dec. 
20, 2000) (to be codified at 20 C.F.R. §§ 655–66). 
81  Id. at 80174. 
82  20 C.F.R. § 655.731(c)(10)(i)(C) (2019). 
83  Id. 
84  ALJ’s Decision and Order at 19, Novinvest, LLC, Docket No. 2002-LCA-00024 (Dep’t 
of Labor Jan. 21, 2003), aff’d, ARB’s Final Decision and Order, Novinvest, LLC, Docket 
No. 02-LCA-24 (Dep’t of Labor July 30, 2004). 
85  Id. at 2, 7. 
86  Id. at 7, 18. 
87  Id. at 2. 
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visions.88 The ALJ found that the award failed under state liquidated damages 
law because the employer did not specify how it arrived at the amount of 
$5,000.89 The employees prevailed under the visa statute, at least in part, be-
cause of the nature of the guest worker-employer relationship and the fact that 
their treatment violated the standards set forth in the visa law.90 Consequently, 
the employer was ordered to return any money it had collected under the state 
judgments to the employees.91 Novinvest illustrates how these cases are adjudi-
cated using principles underlying state contract law, with the enhanced protec-
tion and nuance required by the visa statute. 
B. The Free Labor Approach 
The free labor approach to evaluating the validity of liquidated damages 
provisions originates in the Thirteenth Amendment to the United States Consti-
tution, passed in 1789, which states “neither slavery nor involuntary servitude 
. . . shall exist within the United States.”92 This Amendment not only abolished 
chattel slavery but also prohibited involuntary servitude and set a policy of free 
and voluntary labor in the United States.93 Shortly thereafter, Congress passed 
two laws aimed at eliminating other systems of unfree labor that continued to 
exist after the abolition of chattel slavery. On March 2, 1867, Congress passed 
a statute variously referred to as the Anti-Peonage Act and the Peonage Aboli-
tion Act.94 Although focused on abolishing the Spanish peonage system estab-
lished in the territory of New Mexico, its language and legislative history co-
vers and prohibits a broad range of oppressive labor arrangements.95 The statute 
read: 
                                                        
88  Id. at 21. 
89  Id. at 22. The Georgia liquidated damages law required a showing that damages are diffi-
cult to estimate, that the amount be intended to cover damages and not be a penalty, and that 
the amount be a reasonable estimate of the probable loss. Id. at 21–22. 
90  The court focused on the requirements under 20 C.F.R. § 655.731(c)(9)(iii). Id. at 19–20. 
91  Id. at 22. 
92  U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. This article only addresses the narrow topic of free labor prohi-
bitions against requiring employees to pay a debt before they may quit work, but the Thir-
teenth Amendment prohibits a variety of other labor arrangements and governmental action, 
as well. 
93  Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4, 17 (1944) (“The undoubted aim of the Thirteenth 
Amendment . . . [was] to maintain a system of completely free and voluntary labor through-
out the United States.”); see also James Gray Pope, Contract, Race, and Freedom of Labor 
in the Constitutional Law of “Involuntary Servitude”, 119 YALE L.J. 1474, 1517 (2010); Lea 
S. VanderVelde, The Labor Vision of the Thirteenth Amendment, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 437, 
438, 453, 495 (1989); Rebecca E. Zietlow, A Positive Right to Free Labor, 39 SEATTLE U. L. 
REV. 859, 861, 877 (2016). 
94  Anti-Peonage Act of 1867, ch. 187, 14 Stat. 546 (1867) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1994 
(2012)); 18 U.S.C. § 1581 (2012). 
95  Aviam Soifer, Federal Protection, Paternalism, and the Virtually Forgotten Prohibition 
of Voluntary Peonage, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1607, 1617 (2012) (explaining the legislative 
history and statute cover voluntary, as well as involuntary, service as a peon and service 
compelled by things other than debt). 
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[T]he holding of any person to service or labor under the system known as pe-
onage is hereby declared to be unlawful, and the same is hereby abolished and 
forever prohibited . . . any attempt . . . to establish, maintain, or enforce, directly 
or indirectly, the voluntary or involuntary service or labor of any persons as pe-
ons, in liquidation of any debt or obligation, or otherwise, be, and the same are 
hereby, declared null and void; and any person or persons who shall hold, arrest, 
or return, or cause to be held, arrested, or returned . . . to a condition of peonage, 
shall, upon conviction, be punished [with criminal sanctions].96 
In 1874, Congress passed a statute commonly referred to as The Padrone 
Statute.97 Aimed at eliminating a system where children were kidnapped in Ita-
ly and brought to the United States to work, its language was much broader.98 It 
read: 
Whoever shall knowingly and willfully bring into the United States . . . any per-
son inveigled or forcibly kidnaped in any other country, with intent to hold such 
person . . . to any involuntary servitude; or whoever shall knowingly and willful-
ly sell or cause to be sold, into any condition of involuntarily servitude, any oth-
er person for any term whatever; or whoever shall knowingly and willfully hold 
to involuntary servitude any person so brought or sold, shall [be subject to crim-
inal penalties].99 
In 1948, Congress worked to revise, codify, and enact into positive law Ti-
tle 18 of the U.S. Code.100 As part of this process, most of the requirements 
within these two early statutes—along with other laws addressing slavery—
found their way in a modern form into Chapter 77 titled “Peonage and Slavery” 
(covering 18 U.S.C. 1581–1588) (hereinafter “Chapter 77”).101 The anti-
peonage statute was split in two. The first part of the anti-peonage statute, abol-
ishing and prohibiting voluntary and involuntary peonage, was codified in a 
different section of the U.S. Code outside of Chapter 77.102 The second part of 
the anti-peonage statute became 18 U.S.C. § 1581.103 It provides that 
“[w]hoever holds or returns any person to a condition of peonage” shall be sub-
                                                        
96  14 Stat. at 546. 
97  United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 945 (1988). 
98  Michael H. LeRoy, Compulsory Labor in a National Emergency: Public Service or Invol-
untary Servitude? The Case of Crippled Ports, 28 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 331, 356 
n.115 (2007). 
99  18 U.S.C. § 446 (1925). 18 U.S.C. § 446 was derived from An Act to Protect Persons of 
Foreign Birth Against Forcible Constraint or Involuntary Servitude, ch. 464, 18 Stat. 251 
(1874), which was repealed by Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 321, § 341, 35 Stat. 1153, 1154 
(1909). 
100  Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 683 (1948). 
101  Id. at 772. The group at the time was codified as 18 U.S.C. §§ 1581–88. Id. 
102  42 U.S.C. § 1994 (2012) provides: 
The holding of any person to service or labor under the system known as peonage is abolished 
and forever prohibited in any Territory or State of the United States; and all . . . usages . . . to es-
tablish, maintain, or enforce, directly or indirectly, the voluntary or involuntary service or labor 
of any persons as peons, in liquidation of any debt or obligation, or otherwise, are declared null 
and void. 
103  62 Stat. at 772. 
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ject to criminal sanctions.104 The Padrone Statute’s prohibition against involun-
tary servitude was later reworked and became 18 U.S.C. § 1584.105 That section 
reads, “[w]hoever knowingly and willfully holds to involuntary servitude or 
sells into any condition of involuntary servitude, any other person” shall be 
subject to criminal sanctions.106 Thus, by the end of the 21st century, one set of 
major free labor statutes was included in Chapter 77, with peonage covered in 
Section 1581 and involuntary servitude covered in Section 1584.107 
Several cases were brought to challenge oppressive working conditions 
under Section 1584, with some, such as United States v. Mussry, succeeding in 
giving a broad reading to involuntary servitude.108 However, in 1988, in 
Kozminski, the Supreme Court gave a very constrained reading to the term “in-
voluntary servitude,” focusing on the need for physical restraint instead of psy-
chological coercion.109 In response to and in order to overrule Kozminski, in 
2000, Congress passed the Trafficking Victim’s Protection Act (“TVPA”).110 It 
added sections 1589-1594 to Title 18 of the U.S. Code, and Chapter 77 became 
“Peonage, Slavery and Trafficking in Persons.”111 The TVPA also increased the 
criminal penalties associated with Section 1581 Peonage and Section 1584 In-
                                                        
104  Id. 
105  Id. at 773.This section is a codification of a combination of the Padrone Statute and the 
Slave Trade Statute, as amended in 1909, formerly 18 U.S.C. § 423 (repealed 1948). United 
States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 945–48 (1988) (discussing codification of acts into 
§ 1584). 
106  18 U.S.C. § 1584 (2012). 
107  Other statutes also build on the free labor guarantee of the Thirteenth Amendment. Equal 
employment statutes, including Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, has its origin in the 
Anti-Peonage Act, as enforced by the Civil Rights Section of the Justice Department and the 
Fair Employment Practices Committee in the 1940’s. RISA L. GOLUBOFF, THE LOST PROMISE 
OF CIVIL RIGHTS 11 (2007) (chronicling the work of the Civil Rights Section, including the 
connection of its work to the Thirteenth Amendment and its work to amend the Anti-
peonage Act); Maria L. Ontiveros, The Fundamental Nature of Title VII, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 
1165, 1178–94 (2014) (tracing the evolution of Title VII through the FEPC and Civil Rights 
Section). The National Labor Relations Act also incorporates the free labor principle of the 
Thirteenth Amendment. James Gray Pope, The Thirteenth Amendment Versus the Commerce 
Clause: Labor and the Shaping of American Constitutional Law, 1921–1957, 102 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1, 39–41 (2002); James Gray Pope, Labor’s Constitution of Freedom, 106 YALE L.J. 
941, 943 (1997). The minimum wage statutes may also be seen as free labor statute connect-
ed to the Thirteenth Amendment. See generally Ruben J. Garcia, The Thirteenth Amendment 
and Minimum Wage Laws, 19 NEV. L.J. 479 (2018). 
108  United States v. Mussry, 726 F.2d 1448, 1451–52, 1455 (9th Cir. 1984). But see United 
States v. Shackney, 333 F.2d 475, 486 (2d Cir. 1964) (limiting definition of involuntary ser-
vitude). 
109  Kozminski, 487 U.S. at 948. This case did not address any financial restriction on the 
workers’ ability to leave employment. 
110  The Trafficking Victim’s Protection Act was passed as part (Division A) of the Victims 
of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 Stat. 1464, 
1466–91 (codified as amended 22 U.S.C. §§ 2152d, 7101–12 (2012)). The TVPA, as passed 
in 2000, is found at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1589–94 (2012). 
111  18 U.S.C. §§ 1589–94 (2012). 
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voluntary Servitude.112 In 2003, Congress amended the TVPA to provide for a 
private, civil cause of action for any violation of Chapter 77.113 
In the TVPA, Congress repudiated the narrow definition of “involuntary” 
and defined involuntary servitude as servitude induced by “any scheme, plan, 
or pattern intended to cause a person to believe that, if the person did not enter 
into or continue in such condition, that person or another person would suffer 
serious harm.”114 It also added section 1589 titled “Forced Labor” which pro-
vided criminal remedies for, among other things, obtaining labor through the 
use of “threats of serious harm” or by a plan intended to cause a person to be-
lieve they would suffer serious harm if they did not perform labor or ser-
vices.115 
In 2008, Congress again amended the TVPA to clarify this definition fur-
ther and broaden protection. Section 1589 now reads: 
(a) Whoever knowingly provides or obtains the labor or services of a person by 
any one of, or by any combination of, the following means-- 
. . . 
(2) by means of serious harm or threats of serious harm to that person or another 
person; 
. . . 
shall be punished as provided under subsection (d).116 
The 2008 amendment also added a definition of “serious harm” to include 
financial harm “that is sufficiently serious, under all the surrounding circum-
stances, to compel a reasonable person of the same background and in the same 
circumstances to perform or to continue performing labor or services in order to 
avoid incurring that harm.”117 In this way, Congress clearly articulated an ex-
pansive, inclusive definition of involuntary, and, for the purposes of examining 
liquidated damages clauses, one that specifically deals with threats of serious 
financial harm. 
These two provisions—the Section 1584 prohibition on involuntary servi-
tude and the Section 1581 prohibition on peonage—can be used to analyze 
whether liquidated damages provisions violate the principle of free labor. The 
current standard being used to determine whether liquidated damage provisions 
violate the Section 1584 prohibition against involuntary servitude tracks the 
language in Section 1589 on forced labor.118 Although Section 1581 prohibits 
peonage, none of the free labor statutes define the term peonage.119 Case law, 
                                                        
112  Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106–386, 114 
Stat. 1464, 1486 (2000) (amending 18 U.S.C. §§1581(a), 1583–1584). 
113  18 U.S.C. § 1595(a) (2012). 
114  22 U.S.C. § 7102(6)(A) (2012). 
115  18 U.S.C. § 1589(a)(2) (2012). 
116  Id. 
117  Id. § 1589(c)(2). 
118  See supra Section II.B. 
119  The Victims of Trafficking and Violence Prevention Act of 2000 does include a defini-
tion for debt bondage, but that term is only used in a few sections of the TVPA requiring 
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however, defines it as the condition of a person compelled to continue to labor 
for another, in payment of a debt, regardless of the size of the debt and regard-
less of whether the arrangement was entered into voluntarily or involuntarily.120 
This section examines each of these prohibitions in more detail, focusing on 
how courts have examined whether liquidated damages provisions violate these 
prohibitions and explicating the purposes behind the prohibitions. 
1. Involuntary Servitude 
Federal law prohibits involuntary servitude, including labor that is obtained 
by means of serious financial harm or threats of serious financial harm.121 Thus, 
when a visa worker is unable to quit because of the serious financial harm he or 
she would suffer from having to pay a large fee for liquidated damages, the 
worker is laboring in a state of involuntary servitude that violates the TVPA. 
This section discusses two cases that reached this conclusion. It then discusses 
the harms associated with involuntary servitude to show why it is prohibited. 
a. Involuntary Servitude and Liquidated Damages 
Several cases have found that liquidated damages provisions violate the 
TVPA. For example, in Nunag-Tanedo v. East Baton Rouge Paris School 
Board, a group of teachers contracted to work for a school district in Louisi-
ana.122 Before they began work, the employer required them to pay $5,000 for 
their visas.123 Subsequently, the employer insisted that the teachers pay an addi-
tional $10,000 and the cost of relocation to the United States; otherwise, the 
teachers would forfeit the $5,000 and not be allowed to travel to the United 
States and begin employment.124 After arriving in the United States, the teach-
ers complained about their living and working situation.125 The employer sued 
one teacher for making complaints and threatened the others with discharge, 
legal action, and deportation if they continued to complain.126 
The court described the situation as follows: 
     Enticed by promises of lucrative and exciting employment through a work 
program, a foreign worker speaks with recruiters about working in the United 
                                                                                                                                
studies and reports. It does not appear to be directly tied to or meant to be used to define pe-
onage as used in the TVPA or Chapter 77. Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection 
Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106–386, 114 Stat. 1464, 1469 (2000) (codified as 22 U.S.C. 
§ 7102). 
120  Pierce v. United States 146 F.2d 84, 87 (5th Cir. 1944); Bernal v. United States, 241 F. 
339, 342 (5th Cir. 1917). 
121  18 USC § 1589(a)(2)–(c)(2). 
122  Nuñag-Tanedo v. E. Baton Rouge Par. Sch. Bd., 790 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1138–39 (C.D. 
Cal. 2011). 
123  Id. at 1138. 
124  Id. at 1138, 1142. 
125  Id. at 1139. 
126  Id. 
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States. The recruiters explain the terms and costs of the work program, and the 
worker gets a large loan and voluntarily uses it to join the program.  
     After the worker joins the program and begins employment, the worker be-
comes unhappy. But if the worker quits, awaiting is a trip home with a massive 
amount of debt that will be impossible to repay. Working in the program is the 
only way to repay the loan. Is this forced labor? Fraud? No. It is a bargained-for 
exchange. Despite the worker’s unhappiness, the terms and costs of the program 
were known, and the worker voluntarily obtained the loan to join the program. 
The worker’s eventual discontent does not transform the valid contract with the 
recruiters into something illegal. 
     But what if after the worker made the payment, the recruiters alter the pro-
gram terms and costs? The recruiters demand an additional payment of double 
what the worker has already paid. They threaten to kick the worker out of the 
program if additional payments aren’t made, and they keep the initial payment 
even if the worker decides to leave to program. The worker is therefore faced 
with a choice of forfeiting the first payment, knowing that repayment of the debt 
may be impossible, or paying the additional money the recruiters now demand. 
Knowing that working in this program is the only way to repay the initial debt, 
the worker pays the additional sum and continues working in the program. 
     Once the worker begins employment, complaints about the payments and 
working conditions are met with continued threats of termination and deporta-
tion. Knowing that this job is the only way to repay the debt, the worker remains 
silent and continues working. Is this forced labor? Fraud?127 
The court found that the threat to forfeit a $5,000 fee already paid to the 
employer if the workers left constituted forced labor through threats of serious 
financial harm because forfeiting $5,000 would constitute an amount equal to a 
year and a half of salary in their home country.128 The teachers felt that they 
had to continue to work for the school district in order to pay the debt.129 They 
also felt compelled to accept the living and working conditions, without com-
plaint, because if they were fired, they would be unable to pay back their 
debt.130 Thus, the workers were held in involuntary servitude because of the 
threat of serious financial harm. 
Similarly, in a default action, the court also found a violation of the TVPA. 
In Macolor v. Libiran, Mr. Macolor came to the United States and signed a 
contract that included a “liquidated damages” clause that required him to pay 
$20,000 if he left work before the end of the contract.131 Because the employer 
did not have work for the plaintiff, he left their employ and sought other work 
in order to pay for food and housing.132 The defendants threatened to bring a 
                                                        
127  Id. at 1137. 
128  Id. at 1144. 
129  Id. 
130  Id. 
131  Macolor v. Libiran, No. 14-CV-4555 (JMF) (RLE), 2016 WL 1488121, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. 
Mar. 25, 2016); Macolor v. Libiran, No. 14-CV-4555 (JMF), 2016 WL 1453039, at *1 
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 13, 2016) (explaining this was a default judgment because the defendant left 
the country and did not return for the proceedings). 
132  Macolor, 2016 WL 1488121, at *3. 
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lawsuit against the plaintiff and retained a collection agency.133 The collection 
agency sent letters to Macolor and called him at home, demanding payment of 
$27,729.67 ($20,000 in principal, $6,666.66 in collection fees, and $1,063.01 in 
interest).134 The Court found a violation of the TVPA because “Defendants’ 
threats to make Macolor pay them $20,000 if he sought other employment con-
stituted a serious threat of financial harm that would coerce a reasonable person 
in Macolor’s circumstances to continue providing labor to Defendants to avoid 
the harm.”135 In both of these cases, the court easily found that the liquidated 
damages clause violated Section 1584. 
b. The Harms of Involuntary Servitude 
By its terms, the Thirteenth Amendment prohibits both slavery and invol-
untary servitude.136 A trilogy of early cases brought under the Anti-Peonage 
Act described two major purposes behind the prohibition of involuntary servi-
tude.137 The first two cases, Bailey v. Alabama and US v. Reynolds, struck 
down convict labor statutes where Blacks were forced to work in order to pay 
off debts related to criminal fines and court costs.138 These cases explained that 
compelled labor violates the Thirteenth Amendment because a person’s labor is 
special and distinct and protected by the anti-slavery mandate.139 Bailey stated 
that the purpose of the Thirteenth Amendment is to ensure free labor because 
“[t]here is no more important concern than to safeguard the freedom of labor 
upon which alone can enduring prosperity be based.”140 The court in Bailey ex-
plained, “The act of Congress, nullifying all state laws by which it should be 
attempted to enforce the ‘service or labor . . . in liquidation of any debt or obli-
gation . . . ’ necessarily embraces all legislation which seeks to compel the ser-
vice or labor by making it a crime to refuse or fail to perform [labor].”141 
The second reason involuntary servitude is prohibited is because the inabil-
ity to exit employment results in worse conditions for participants in the free 
labor market. In Pollock v. Williams, the Supreme Court explained how a sys-
tem of compelled labor, in order to pay a debt, destroyed the floor for free la-
bor.142 It explained: 
                                                        
133  Id. 
134  Id. 
135  Id. at *4. 
136  U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1. 
137  Although these cases were brought under the Anti-Peonage Statute, these cases are dis-
cussed in this section because the Court’s reasoning in the cases focus more on the prohibi-
tion of involuntary servitude, in general, rather than on the harms of associated with debt 
peonage. 
138  United States v. Reynolds, 235 U.S. 133, 150 (1914); Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 
237–39 (1911). 
139  Reynolds, 235 U.S. at 150; Bailey, 219 U.S. at 239. 
140  Bailey, 219 U.S. at 245. 
141  Id. at 243. 
142  Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4, 18 (1944). 
19 NEV. L.J. 413, ONTIVEROS 4/8/2019  5:44 PM 
432 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 19:2  
The undoubted aim of the Thirteenth Amendment . . . was . . . to maintain a sys-
tem of completely free and voluntary labor throughout the United States. . . . [I]n 
general, the defense against oppressive hours, pay, working conditions, or treat-
ment is the right to change employers. When the master can compel and the la-
borer cannot escape the obligation to go on, there is no power below to redress 
and no incentive above to relieve a harsh overlordship or unwholesome condi-
tions of work. Resulting depression of working conditions and living standards 
affects not only the laborer under the system, but every other with whom his la-
bor comes in competition.143 
Professor James Gray Pope describes the “Pollock Principle” as one which 
focuses on preventing domination and exploitation by allowing workers to quit 
in order to encourage them to provide better conditions.144 
These twin evils—harsh infringements on the sanctity of human labor and 
the destruction of the floor for free labor—can be seen in the treatment of visa 
workers in the United States. H-2 agricultural workers and laborers face prob-
lems such as low pay, wage theft, poor conditions, and racially motivated har-
assment and abuse.145 In addition, their access to the legal system is severely 
restrained.146 These workers are unable to complain and improve their situation. 
Even highly-skilled H-1B technical workers endure poor workplace condi-
tions, spanning a continuum of exploitation depending upon the worker's situa-
tion. These workers are routinely made to work long hours for wages below 
those paid to non-visa workers and below those prescribed by law.147 A group 
of 800 of these workers, tagged the “Siebel Slaves” by the media, were given 
an impossible amount of work to do in a short period of time, which resulted in 
“overwork, sleep deprivation, and health problems, including miscarriages.”148 
Other workers are brought to the United States and made to wait, in violation of 
the visa statute, without a job and without pay, for months on end.149 During 
this time, they may be housed in an overcrowded apartment, charged excessive 
rent, and be prohibited from leaving the neighborhood of the apartment.150 
Once employed, the visa holder may engage in wage theft—taking both a per-
centage of the employee’s wages and taking money—to pay for the cost of 
housing and to recoup money lent to the employees when they were not work-
ing.151 The workers are unable to complain about these conditions because of 
                                                        
143  Id. at 17–18. 
144  Pope, supra note 93, at 1503. 
145  See Etan Newman, No Way to Treat a Guest: Why the H-2A Agricultural Visa Program 
Fails U.S. and Foreign Workers, FARMWORKER JUST., 7, 23, https://www.farmworkerjustice. 
org/sites/default/files/documents/7.2.a.6%20fwj.pdf [https://perma.cc/32BE-2PH3] (last vis-
ited Jan. 7, 2019). 
146  Id. at 25. 
147  Ontiveros, supra note 24, at 11. 
148  Id. at 10. The group brought a class action lawsuit which they settled for 27.5 million 
dollars. Id. 
149  Id. at 19–23. 
150  Id. at 22. 
151  Id. 
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the threat of serious financial harm. In addition, this situation has made it easier 
for high-tech companies to exploit non-visa workers, using the threat of re-
placement to reduce wages and quiet complaints.152 These are exactly the 
harms discussed in the involuntary servitude cases. 
2. Debt Peonage 
Currently, there are no reported liquidated damages guest worker visa cas-
es where the worker alleged that the liquidated damages clause violated 14 
USC § 1994 prohibiting peonage (hereinafter “Section 1994”); 18 USC § 1581 
providing criminal penalties for peonage (hereinafter “Section 1581”); or 18 
USC § 1594 providing for a private cause of action under 1581 (hereinafter 
“Section 1594”). However, cases arising under these statutes, as well as Section 
1584 on involuntary servitude, do examine the types of arrangements that are 
prohibited as debt peonage in other factual situations. This section discusses 
those cases, how Sections 1994, 1581 and 1595 would fit the case of liquidated 
damages clauses in guest worker contracts, and the unique harms associated 
with debt peonage. 
a. Debt Peonage and Liquidated Damages 
In the modern era, most peonage cases have been brought as criminal cases 
under Section 1581.153 A typical Section 1581 case involves an employee or 
group of employees incurring a debt to come to the United States to work for a 
particular employer.154 Once in the U.S. the employer uses threats of physical 
force, arrest, and deportation, as well as psychological coercion, to compel a 
person to continue to work and pay off a debt owed to the employer.155 In ana-
lyzing these cases, courts start with the recognition that compulsory service in 
payment of a debt is a form of involuntary servitude.156 These cases emphasize 
that peonage includes voluntary arrangements, even if they are not covered by a 
prohibition against involuntary servitude. United States v. Kyongja Kang ex-
plained the distinction between peonage and involuntary servitude by defining 
peonage as: 
[A] status or condition of compulsory service, based upon the indebtedness of 
the peon to the master. The basal fact is indebtedness. . . . Peonage is sometimes 
classified as voluntary or involuntary; but this implies simply a difference in the 
mode or origin, but none in the character of the servitude. . . . But peonage, 
                                                        
152  Id. at 24. 
153  18 U.S.C. § 1581 (2012); Anti-Peonage Act of 1867, ch. 187, 14 Stat. 546 (1867); Mo-
hamed Y. Mattar, Interpreting Judicial Interpretations of the Criminal Statutes of the Traf-
ficking Victims Protection Act: Ten Years Later, 19 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 1247, 
1273–75 (2011). 
154  See Mattar, supra note 153, at 1273–74. 
155  Id. at 1273–74. 
156  United States v. Farrell, 563 F.3d 364, 372 (8th Cir. 2009); United States v. Booker, 655 
F.2d 562, 565 (4th Cir. 1981). 
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however created, is compulsory service,—involuntary servitude. . . . That which 
is contemplated by the statute is compulsory service to secure the payment of a 
debt.157 
These cases emphasize that the prohibited relationship is one where the 
employee is compelled to labor under the control of the employer by virtue of 
debt, no matter how small the debt or whether the employee voluntarily entered 
into the relationship. 
Another line of cases that examines the concept of involuntary servitude, in 
the context of debt peonage, are cases dealing with the requirement that certain 
individuals work in order to avoid incarceration—either to pay off debts to the 
court, as a condition of probation or parole, or to make legally mandated child 
support payments.158 These cases provide a very narrow view of debt peonage, 
focusing on the requirement that the debt be tied to a particular employer rather 
than debt in general. In this regard, Moss v. Superior Court provides one of the 
most extensive discussions of involuntary servitude in the context of debt pe-
onage.159 The court considered whether the requirement that a father work in 
order to pay child support or go to jail constituted involuntary servi-
tude/peonage.160 The court focused on the historical roots of the free labor stat-
utes meant to attack systems such as apprenticeships, plantation serfs and Span-
ish peonage, which involved involuntary servitude in payment of a debt and a 
close relationship between the employer and employee.161 It also focused on 
those cases where the state has the power to “return the servant to the master 
. . . or indirectly by subjecting persons who left the employer’s service to crim-
inal penalties . . . .”162 Based on these and other cases dealing with involuntary 
servitude, the court concluded: 
     When, as here, however, the person claiming involuntary servitude is simply 
expected to seek and accept employment, if available, and is free to choose the 
type of employment and the employer, and is also free to resign that employ-
ment if the conditions are unsatisfactory or to accept other employment, none of 
                                                        
157  United States v. Kyongja Kang, No. 04 CR 87(ILG), 2006 WL 208882, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. 
Jan. 25, 2006); see also Dolla v. UniCast Co., 930 F. Supp. 202, 205 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (“Pe-
onage is a ‘condition of compulsory service, based upon indebtedness of the peon to the 
master.’ . . . [T]he critical elements of a peonage claim are indebtedness and compulsion.”) 
(citation omitted). 
158  Noah D. Zatz, A New Peonage?: Pay, Work, or Go to Jail in Contemporary Child Sup-
port Enforcement and Beyond, 39 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 927, 948–49 (2016) (examining the 
requirement that child support payment orders can be enforced through arrest and imprison-
ment). 
159  Moss v. Superior Court, 950 P.2d 59, 66–73 (Cal. 1998). 
160  Id. at 61, 74. 
161  Id. at 70–71 (arguing that the purpose of the statute was to invalidate “the involuntary or 
involuntary service of labor of any persons as peons in liquidation of any debt or obliga-
tion”) (citing 1 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: CIVIL 
RIGHTS, 171 (1970) and Sydney Brodie, The Federally Secured Right to be Free from Bond-
age, 40 GEO. L.J. 367, 376–77 (1952)). 
162  Id. at 71. 
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the aspects of “involuntary servitude” which invoke the need to apply a contex-
tual approach to Thirteenth Amendment analysis are present. There is no “servi-
tude” since the worker is not bound to any particular employer and has no re-
strictions on his freedom other than the need to comply with a lawful order to 
support a child.163 
Although the Moss decision is somewhat obfuscating because it blends to-
gether issues of peonage and involuntary servitude, it does provide one way to 
distinguish debt peonage from other types of involuntary servitude. It presents 
the argument for a very restrictive definition of debt peonage—the obligation to 
work for a particular person in order to pay off a debt. 
Liquidated damages clauses in guest worker visa contracts fall within even 
this narrow definition of debt peonage. Since a visa is granted for a specific job 
for a specific company, the immigrant must work exclusively for that employer 
and may not change jobs or even accept outside work because any other em-
ployer would not have a visa allowing the immigrant to work in the United 
States. When the visa holder is a subcontracting company or labor agency, the 
agency determines when, where, and for whom the immigrant works.164 These 
agencies also control the amount of money earned by the immigrant, as well as 
whether a company may reassign or sublease the employee.165 When the visa 
contract includes a large liquidated damages clause, the employee is compelled 
to continue to work for that particular employer in order to avoid having to pay 
a large debt. As such, contracts with liquidated damages clauses constitute pro-
hibited debt peonage and violates the statute. 
b. The Harms of Debt Peonage 
Under the most restrictive definition of debt peonage found in cases like 
Moss, the harm of debt peonage is that a worker is tied to one particular per-
son.166 In this context, the harm is because the labor of the employee is essen-
tially owned by a particular person until the debt is extinguished. The notion 
that one person has exclusive ownership of someone else’s labor runs afoul of 
the ideal of free labor. Both the Spanish peonage system and the Padrone sys-
tem, which were addressed in the early statutes, had this characteristic.167 
This characteristic was also integral to the system of antebellum chattel 
slavery. A slave’s owner had exclusive ownership of the slave’s labor, even be-
yond the work directly performed for the owner. Slave codes, the laws that reg-
ulated slavery in the American South, gave slave owners the right to control the 
labor of their slaves because, in addition to owning the slave, they also owned 
                                                        
163  Id. at 72 (emphasis added). 
164  Ontiveros, supra note 24, at 26. 
165  Id. 
166  Id. 
167  Other 19th century systems with similar exclusive ownership include apprenticeships and 
plantation serf systems. 
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the labor of the slave.168 For example, the slave owner could assign a slave to 
work for someone else and collect payment in exchange for their labor. In addi-
tion, the codes gave slave owners the right to control, forbid, or profit from any 
independent entrepreneurial work done by slaves.169 Some slaves tended a gar-
den and sold the food at a local market, while others might have worked as a 
blacksmith on Sundays or mended and sewed clothes for others, at night, in ex-
change for money. The slave owner could dictate whether this work could be 
done, where it could be done, and could demand a percentage of the money 
earned. The slave owner, then, owned and controlled not only the slave but also 
the labor of the slave and dictated every aspect of when, where, and how they 
could work, as well as for how much money. 
The guest worker visa system operates in a similar way because the em-
ployer that holds the visa controls—essentially owns—the labor of the guest 
worker hired to fill the visa. It exclusively controls when, where, for whom, and 
for how much the immigrant can work. If the immigrant refuses that work, he 
or she must leave the country. In this way, the employee does not control his or 
her own labor—it is owned by the visa holder in a manner that parallels slave 
ownership.170 
In the United States, this arrangement is unique to the visa system. Alt-
hough an employer may direct its workforce and tell an employee where and 
when to work, there are significant differences for visa workers. A non-visa 
employee is always free to quit without having to pay a large liquidated dam-
ages fee and without having to leave the country. More importantly, free non-
visa employees are allowed to take additional jobs without interference from 
their employer. There may be some limits on outside work if there is a valid 
noncompetition clause, but these are limited to situations where an employee 
working for a competitor could damage the employer.171 Perhaps the closest 
situation are temporary agencies that assign workers to different job sites and 
employers for short term assignments. In that situation, the temporary agency 
controls when, where, and for whom the employee works, as well as the wage. 
However, the employee is always free to decline an assignment and, most sig-
nificantly, can look for and accept work with other employers at the same time. 
Neither an employer nor a temporary agency owns or controls the labor of the 
employee outside of the immediate work relationship. 
The key distinction, then, is whether and to what extent the employee has 
access to enter the labor market and participate freely in it. Visa workers do not 
                                                        
168  For a thorough discussion of slave codes, see KENNETH M. STAMPP, THE PECULIAR 
INSTITUTION: SLAVERY IN THE ANTE-BELLUM SOUTH (Vintage Books ed. 1989); see also On-
tiveros, supra note 24, at 25–26, 28, 86. 
169  Vernon Valentine Palmer, The Customs of Slavery: The War Without Arms, 48 AM. J. 
LEGAL HIST. 177, 180 (2006). 
170  Ontiveros, supra note 24, at 26. 
171  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (describing when a 
restraint on trade is unconscionable). 
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have access because the visa holder owns and controls their labor. Other work-
ers in the United States, however, have full access to the labor market without 
the control of any other employer. Even the narrow definition of debt peonage 
applies to visa workers because the employee is bound to work for a single em-
ployer. 
Although liquidated damages clauses for guest workers can succeed under 
this narrow definition, limiting the definition of debt peonage to debt owed a 
particular employer, is too constrained for several reasons. First, it is so narrow 
that it is inconsistent with the language of the statute originally prohibiting pe-
onage. Section 1994 prohibits peonage “in liquidation of any debt or obligation, 
or otherwise”.172 After examining the legislative history of the Peonage Aboli-
tion Act of 1867, Dean Aviam Soifer explains the breadth of the Act.173 By its 
terms, the Act “did not restrict the definition of the peonage; it forbade com-
pelled labor due to ‘debt.’ Yet the 1867 Act also recognized that the treatment 
it sought to prohibit, whether involuntary or voluntary, could be compelled in 
many different ways.”174 He argues that this expansion of the definition of pe-
onage, beyond the traditional definition anchored in debt, was necessary be-
cause of the varying contexts in which employers and society in the reconstruc-
tion South might enforce a system of peonage. These included contracts for 
indentured servitude and the custom and usage of private violence sponsored 
by groups such as the Ku Klux Klan.175 Prohibiting voluntary as well as invol-
untary peonage was necessary to overcome arguments in favor of freedom of 
contract that might be used to challenge these systems.176 Based on further 
analysis of the legislative history, Soifer argues that the purpose of the Peonage 
Prohibition Act is intentionally broad to protect the most vulnerable popula-
tions, and urges advocates to explore using Section 1994 in private causes of 
action.177 This understanding of the free labor statutes addressing peonage call 
for a broad definition of peonage—limiting it to debt-based requirements tied 
to one employer does not match the legislative history or purpose of the stat-
utes. 
In addition, Professor Noah Zatz criticizes this narrow definition of debt 
peonage because the difference between requiring work for one employer ver-
sus requiring work in general is illusory.178 He argues: 
                                                        
172  42 U.S.C. § 1994 (2012) (emphasis added). 
173  Soifer, supra note 95, at 1617. 
174  Id. 
175  Id. at 1617–18. He also argues that the broad reading is consistent with the expanded 
powers of the reconstruction congress. See id. at 1637–38. 
176  Id. at 1632. 
177  Aviam Soifer, Old Lines in New Battles: An Overlooked Yet Useful Statute to Confront 
Exploitation of Undocumented Workers by Employers and by ICE, 19 NEV. L.J. 397, 398–99 
(2018). 
178  Zatz, supra note 158, at 950. 
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If an obligation to Person A can be satisfied only by working, and failure to 
work triggers prosecution and imprisonment, the Thirteenth Amendment prob-
lems are scarcely affected by whether the work is for Person A or some other 
Person B. The core difficulty would remain: the worker would be bound to Per-
son B by the carceral threat, eliminating the leverage that comes with the right to 
quit and subjecting him to the risk of “a harsh overlordship.”179 
In addition, he argues that the ability to work for a variety of employers is 
insufficient when the alternative is to go to jail.180 In his opinion, mere freedom 
to circulate in the labor market is not the same as free labor, so long as incar-
ceration is the alternative.181 The harm to a system of free labor, in his view, 
arises when a person is unable to withdraw from the labor market, under threat 
of incarceration.182 Finally, he explains that free labor requires an unfettered 
right to quit employment; however, all the employee has in the narrow defini-
tion of debt peonage is an unfettered right to switch employers.183 In this situa-
tion, an employee may only quit IF he or she has secured another job al-
ready.184 He concludes “criminalizing unemployment among debtors cannot 
easily be distinguished from criminalizing debtors’ labor mobility between em-
ployers—the latter being the evil attacked directly in the peonage cases.”185 
Since the same harms associated with involuntary servitude would exist in pe-
onage cases that do not require work for a specific employer, the definition 
should be broader. 
III. THE PANWAR CASE REVISITED 
This section returns to the Panwar case discussed briefly at the outset of 
the article, and presents and critiques the outcome.186 Panwar is used as a para-
digm example because its two opinions embody the contract and free labor ap-
proaches to evaluating liquidated damages. These opinions also reveal im-
portant implications and recommendations for advocates, courts, and Congress. 
A. Panwar 
RS Panwar attended graduate school in the United States and took a 
placement with Access Technology as an H-1B worker.187 Before starting 
                                                        
179  Id. (making arguments based upon involuntary servitude cases discussed supra and quot-
ing Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4, 18 (1944)). 
180  Id. at 951. 
181  Id. (distinguishing this from the typical situation faced by all workers where they must 
work or be unable to provide for their material subsistence). 
182  Id. at 952. 
183  Id. 
184  Id. 
185  Id. 
186  See Panwar I, 975 F. Supp. 2d 948 (S.D. Ind. 2013); Panwar II, No. 1:12-CV-00619-
TWP-TAB, 2015 WL 1396599 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 25, 2015). 
187  Panwar I, 975 F. Supp. 2d at 953–54. 
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work, Access Technology required him to execute a promissory note promising 
to pay $20,000 if he left before the end of the contract term.188 When the em-
ployer did not provide the type of job or compensation promised, Panwar com-
plained and tried to get information about his future.189 Access Therapies 
threatened to terminate his employment if he did not stop trying to improve his 
circumstances.190 Panwar wanted to quit, but he could not leave employment 
because of the threat of having to pay the $20,000—especially since the em-
ployer had a practice of filing lawsuits against former employees who terminat-
ed their contracts early.191 
1. Outcome 
After being terminated, Panwar sued Access Technology for a variety of 
causes of action, including a violation of Section 1589 of the TVPA.192 In 
Panwar I, the U.S. district court in Indiana considered a motion to dismiss.193 It 
found that Panwar stated a claim for a violation of the TVPA because the threat 
of being in debt from having to pay $20,000 constituted a threat of serious fi-
nancial harm that prevented Panwar from voluntarily terminating his employ-
ment.194 
Two years later, in Panwar II, the same district court ruled on the merits of 
the case, and found in favor of the defendant on the TVPA claim.195 According 
to the court, the TVPA claim failed for several reasons.196 First, it found that 
there was not a “forced labor scheme.”197 It stated that because plaintiffs “vol-
untarily entered into the employment contracts,” it could not be a forced labor 
scheme.198 Similarly, it stated that plaintiffs were not coerced or deceived into 
signing the agreements.199 The court emphasized that “There was nothing that 
compelled Mr. Panwar . . . to sign the agreements with RN Staff and Access 
Therapies, or even enter into the H-1B visa program, besides [his] own 
                                                        
188  Id. at 957. 
189  Id. at 954. 
190  Id. 
191  Panwar II, 2015 WL 1396599, at *3. 
192  Panwar I, 975 F. Supp. 2d at 957. 
193  See id. at 958. 
194  Id. 
195  Panwar II, 2015 WL 1396599, at *5. 
196  Id. at *3–4. 
197  Id. at *3. 
198  Id. (“While Plaintiffs continually refer to their employment with Access Therapies and 
RN Staff as a ‘forced labor scheme,’ the fact that they voluntarily entered into the employ-
ment contracts belies this characterization.”). 
199  Id. (“The contract terms were plainly written, and the liquidated damages provision was 
made conspicuous, particularly with the use of the corresponding promissory note. Both Mr. 
Panwar and Mr. Agustin understood the agreements and their obligations under the agree-
ments, including the consequences of early termination.”). 
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choice.”200 In evaluating the forced labor claim, the court focused on the initial 
decision to enter into the contract, rather than the subsequent points in time 
when Panwar wanted to complain about potentially illegal conduct of the em-
ployer and wanted to quit but could not because of the financial threat.201 In 
addition, the court used its own definition of voluntariness and force to analyze 
this claim, rather than referring to specific language of the TVPA.202 
Second, the court said that the TVPA claim failed because the liquidated 
damages would be allowable under state law and the visa statute.203 It ex-
plained that while the visa statute prohibits employers from penalizing employ-
ees for ceasing employment, it allows for bona fide liquidated damages and the 
validity of liquidated damage clauses must be based on Indiana law.204 Accord-
ing to the court, “Under Indiana law, ‘[w]here the sum stipulated in the agree-
ment is not greatly disproportionate to the loss likely to occur, the provision 
will be accepted as a liquidated damages clause and not as a penalty.’ ”205 The 
court found that Panwar did not present evidence that the amount of liquidated 
damages was grossly disproportionate to the losses incurred by the employer 
and credited evidence by the employer that it “must expend thousands of dol-
lars to bring H-1B employees into the United States, including visa filing fees, 
lawyer fees, administrative costs, and local agency fees. Additionally, Access 
Therapies and RN Staff would lose out on potential profits earned from placing 
employees with paying clients.”206 As a result, it found the liquidated damages 
provisions valid under both the H-1B regulations and state law.207 It then con-
cluded, “The Court will not penalize Defendants under the TVPA for practices 
which they are explicitly permitted to utilize under the relevant laws.”208 The 
court essentially performed a contract law analysis on the validity of the liqui-
dated damages provision. It then concluded that any liquidated damages provi-
sion that is permitted by contract law could not violate the TVPA.209 
                                                        
200  Id. 
201  See id. at *4–5. 
202  Id. at *3. 
203  Id. at *4. 
204  Id. (“The claim that the liquidated damages provision and the promissory note constitut-
ed a threat of financial harm sufficient for a finding of liability under the TVPA is not sup-
ported by the evidence or the applicable legal principles. An H-1B employer is not permitted 
to require an employee to pay a ‘penalty’ for ceasing employment. See 20 C.F.R. 
655.731(c)(10)(i)(A). However, ‘[t]he employer is permitted to receive bona fide liquidated 
damages from the H-1B nonimmigrant who ceases employment with the employer prior to 
the agreed date.’ ”) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 655.731(c)(10)(i)(B)). 
205  Id. at *4 (quoting Gershin v. Demming, 685 N.E.2d 1125, 1128 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997)). 
206  Id. 
207  See id. 
208  Id. 
209  Id. 
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2. Critique of Outcome 
A critique of Panwar highlights the different policies served by the con-
tract and free labor approaches and the problem that results when judges do not 
understand these differences or analyze the claims separately. The decision is 
problematic under both the contract and free labor approaches. The decision 
grounds its analysis in the contract law perspective. From this perspective, the 
court focuses on the evidence presented by the employer that the liquidated 
damages clause reasonably approximates the thousands of dollars that an em-
ployer could expend in bringing an H-1B worker to the United States and prof-
its lost from potential clients. Although this satisfies one requirement of a valid 
liquidated damages clause, this argument potentially fails under state law be-
cause there is no showing that these costs would be difficult to quantify. Most 
states require a showing of both of these.210 If the amount can be easily quanti-
fied, there is no need for a liquidated damages clause and the clause can look 
more like a punitive clause than a compensatory one. 
Even if the court is correct in applying state contract law, the decision is 
still faulty under the contract law approach because it fails to correctly analyze 
the contract law approach language found in the visa regulations. First, the 
court did not take into account the coercive nature of the relationship that de-
veloped between the parties after the initial agreement. The statute specifically 
requires this analysis, both in determining whether the agreement is valid and 
whether the employer’s actions contributed to the early cessation of the em-
ployment.211 By focusing only on the relationship at the outset of contract, the 
court fails to apply the regulations. In addition, the court does not recognize the 
all-or-nothing nature of the liquidated damages clause. Since Panwar would be 
required to pay the entire $20,000 regardless of how long he worked for the de-
fendant, it runs afoul of the visa statute requirement that a proper liquidated 
damages clause should take into account whether the breach is total or partial. 
Without a variable liquidated damages clause, the penalty for leaving no longer 
tracks the actual harm caused to the employer by the breach because some per-
centage of the sunk costs have already been recovered. In addition, when the 
time period is shortened, the employer faces fewer potential lost profits earned 
from placing employees with paying clients. Thus, the two reasons given by the 
employer as the basis for the compensatory damages decline when the employ-
ee works for a longer period of time. As a result, the clause appears to be more 
of a penalty for stopping work near the end of the contract term instead of a 
valid compensatory clause. This court’s failure to correctly apply the visa stat-
ute is particularly important because the court grounds its denial of the TVPA 
claim on its assertion that it would be allowable under the visa statute. 
More importantly, the court did not correctly analyze the case under the 
free labor concerns articulated in the TVPA’s prohibition on involuntary servi-
                                                        
210  See supra Section II.A.1. 
211  See supra Section II.A.2. 
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tude. The court ignored the definition of forced labor found in the statute and 
focused instead on general ideas of voluntariness, force and coercion. Unlike 
Nunag-Tanedo and Macalor, the Panwar court inexplicably never mentions the 
language of the TVPA that defines forced labor as labor obtained through the 
threat of serious financial harm. In amending the TVPA to overturn Kozminski 
and then add additional clarification, Congress has explicitly defined and rede-
fined forced labor and involuntary servitude to provide precise and specific def-
initions, rejecting general, restrictive definitions of what constitutes involuntary 
labor. These precise and specific definitions of involuntariness and force were 
ignored by the Panwar court. 
Since it ignored this language, the court also failed to discuss the contextu-
al nature of the definition of severe financial harm.212 The TVPA states that the 
coercive nature of the amount must be judged using the standard of a reasona-
ble person in the plaintiff’s situation and whether it would compel them to keep 
working.213 This is a critical requirement because even if the amount charged in 
liquidated damage is reasonably related to the loss, it may still be so large that 
it prevents a worker from being able to voluntarily end his employment. In this 
way, it violates the TVPA. Clearly, a liquidated damages provision may not be 
large relative to the damages incurred by an employer but still be large enough 
to constitute a serious threat of financial harm to an employee. Such a sum 
would violate the TVPA because there is no exception made in the forced labor 
statute for reasonable liquidated damages. The prohibition is clear and must be 
made independently of any contract law determination. 
The inability to analyze the claims separately is at the heart of the problem 
with Panwar II. The court explicitly conflated the contract law and free labor 
approaches when it said “The Court will not penalize Defendants under the 
TVPA for practices which they are explicitly permitted to utilize under the rel-
evant laws.”214 This statement illustrates the twin problems with the decision. 
As discussed above, the practices were not allowable under the visa law. More 
importantly, the TVPA serves different policies and must be analyzed separate-
ly. Neither state contract law nor the visa law preempt the free labor mandate 
found in the TVPA. 
B. Implications and Strategic Recommendations 
This examination of the Panwar case generates implications and recom-
mendations for action to be taken in the courtroom and in Congress. Advocates 
need to start bringing a wider variety of claims in these cases, and judges must 
                                                        
212  The contextual nature of coercion is found both in the statute and in the case law devel-
oping under the TVPA. See generally Kathleen Kim, The Coercion of Trafficked Workers, 
96 IOWA L. REV. 409, 416 (2011) (analyzing the development of the “situational coercion” 
approach to coercion under the TVPA). 
213  Id. at 451. 
214  Panwar v. Access Therapies, Inc., No. 1:12–CV–00619–TWP–TAB, 2015 WL 1396599, 
at *4 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 25, 2015). 
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recognize the independent nature of the claims. In addition, Congress should 
amend Chapter 77 to include a definition for peonage. These actions can lead to 
better protection of workers. 
1. Courtroom Recommendations for Advocates and Judges 
Advocates challenging liquidated damage clauses in guest worker contracts 
should bring a wide variety of claims, depending upon the specific facts of the 
case. Advocates should continue to file involuntary servitude/forced labor 
claims under Section 1584. In these cases, the definition of forced labor as 
found in the TVPA must be utilized by judges when deciding the claims. When 
a person in similar circumstances to the plaintiff would find the sum of money 
owed to the employer is so large that they are unable to quit, the clause violates 
the prohibitions on involuntary servitude and forced labor. This is true, even if 
the amount required is a reasonable approximation of costs incurred by the em-
ployer when the employee quits or otherwise seems reasonable. 
Advocates should also begin to bring claims alleging debt peonage under 
Section 1582. These claims should be made any time an employee must either 
continue to work for a specific employer or incur a significant debt. Advocates 
should argue that these arrangements constitute peonage, even if the arrange-
ment was entered into voluntarily and even if the amount is fairly small. If 
Panwar had brought a claim, the analysis would have shown that, even though 
he voluntarily entered into the agreement, he was forced to continue to work for 
Access Technologies in order to extinguish his debt. He did not have the free-
dom to work for any other employer as a way to pay the debt because his only 
work authorization was with Access Technologies. Thus, his labor was com-
pelled by debt to a specific employer in violation of Section 1582. 
Finally, advocates should bring claims for violations of the visa statute ar-
guing that the liquidated damages clauses violate the visa statute when there is 
evidence of fraud or coercion; where the clause is not variable so it does not 
take into account whether the breach is total or partial; and where a quit is actu-
ally a discharge caused by the employer’s illegal actions. Employees who are 
sued for enforcement of liquidated damages provisions must be ready to argue 
that the liquidated damages clauses are unenforceable under state contract law. 
The best arguments are likely to be that the employer has not explained the 
compensatory bases for the costs or that the costs are not difficult to quantify. 
When confronted with both free labor claims and contract law claims, 
judges must recognize that these are independent claims and the policies behind 
these two types of claims are vastly different from each other. As a result, they 
should consider each claim independently and not suggest that compliance with 
one set of laws means that the defendant cannot be found liable under the other 
set of laws. The policies behind contract law focus on efficiency and compen-
sation. In this way, liquidated damages that are really coercive penalties used to 
prevent workers from quitting employment do not serve those policies. The 
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policies behind the free labor approach focus on the moral harm to individuals 
and society when people are forced to give their human labor, their human es-
sence, without the ability to terminate the labor arrangement.215 In any system 
of involuntary servitude, whether caused by a financial threat or otherwise, 
there is also a harm to individual employees who suffer from poor work condi-
tions and are unable to escape those conditions by quitting. Other workers also 
suffer because they are forced to compete against workers with no bargaining 
power, so the floor for free labor is destroyed. Finally, there is a moral harm 
when one particular employer essentially owns the labor of a particular person 
who is unable break that bondage and work for someone else. Liquidated dam-
ages clauses in visa contracts can violate these principles in a myriad of ways. 
Courts must understand the two different policies being served and must not 
conflate these two claims because they serve such distinct policies. 
2. Congressional Recommendation for Amendment of Chapter 77 
The free labor statutes dealing with peonage should be amended and clari-
fied. Currently, no definition of peonage is found in Section 1581 or any other 
part of Chapter 77.216 
Section 1994 abolishes and prohibits peonage, which it says includes “vol-
untary or involuntary service” of labor as a peon in liquidation of debt or oth-
erwise.217 Case law from Section 1581 focuses on prohibiting the continued 
compelled labor of another person, in payment of a debt, regardless of the size 
of debt and regardless of whether the arrangement was entered into voluntarily 
or involuntarily.218 Other cases focus on the prohibition of compelled labor 
when the debt is owed to one particular employer.219 
Chapter 77 should be amended to include a broad definition of peonage 
that addresses all these situations. A good starting point for discussion of this 
definition would be: 
1. The following arrangements are per se violations of the prohibition against 
peonage: any arrangement, whether entered into voluntarily or involuntarily, 
whereby an individual must work for one specific employer or remain in debt to 
that employer is prohibited. 
2. In addition, arrangements, whether entered into voluntarily or involuntarily, 
that compel the service of labor in liquidation of debt, may violate the prohibi-
tion against peonage, even if the amount is relatively small. 
                                                        
215  See supra Section II.B. 
216  See supra notes 101–07, 119 and accompanying text. As mentioned previously, the 
TVPA included a definition of debt bondage; however, that term is not found in the free la-
bor provisions of Chapter 77. It is utilized in other parts of the TVPA that require monitoring 
and reporting of certain activities. 
217  42 U.S.C. § 1994 (2012). 
218  See Pierce v. United States, 146 F.2d 84, 87–88 (5th Cir. 1944). See also supra Section 
II.B.2. 
219  See supra Section II.B.2.a. 
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3. Nothing in this definition shall be used to limit claims made that fit 
within the definition of peonage found in Section 1994. 
In this definition, part one makes it clear that arrangements that violate the 
most narrow definition of debt peonage, are explicitly prohibited. Most liqui-
dated damages clauses found in guest worker contracts would fall under this 
prohibition. In addition, part two incorporates the broad language from existing 
case law and statutes. Finally, the third part preserves the ability of advocates to 
creatively reach new situations that might fit under the purpose and language of 
the Anti-Peonage Act. 
CONCLUSION 
Non-immigrant workers who come to the United States to work on tempo-
rary guest worker visas may find themselves in a situation of involuntary servi-
tude or debt peonage. The use of liquidated damages clauses in their employ-
ment contracts creates this situation when the employee cannot quit because of 
the threat of serious financial harm or when they find themselves compelled to 
work for a single employer in order to pay off the debt. Either of these situa-
tions violate the free labor principle established in the Thirteenth Amendment 
and statutes passed pursuant thereto. Unfortunately, some courts only review 
these clauses under a contract law model and fail to free the workers from ser-
vitude or peonage. Although a legislative amendment to clarify the definition of 
peonage would be helpful, advocates can still successfully attack these ar-
rangements using the existing statutes so long as judges understand and vali-
date the important policies found in the free labor statutes. 
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